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This paper explores how the Bank of Japan (BOJ) dealt with the trade-off between stability 
of the financial system and the moral hazard of banks in pre-war Japan. The BOJ 
concentrated Lender of Last Resort (LLR) loans with those banks that had an established 
transaction relationship with the BOJ. At the same time, the BOJ carefully selected its 
transaction counterparts, and did not hesitate to end the relationship if the performance of 
a counterpart declined. Further, the BOJ was selective in providing LLR loans. Through 







Key words: lender of last resort, central bank, monetary policy, financial crisis, bank, Japan   
JEL Classification numbers: E52, E58, G21, N15, N25  3
1. Introduction 
Since Bagehot (1873), the central banks of many countries have come to adopt the 
role of Lender of Last Resort (LLR), and we have a rich store of theoretical and empirical 
literature on LLR (Goodhart 1985; Miron 1986; Bordo 1990; Goodhart and Huang 2005, 
among others). According to the “classical view” of the LLR, the Central Bank should 
prevent illiquid but solvent banks from failing by lending money at a penalty rate (Bordo 
1990, p.19). That LLR lending has been effective in preventing bank panics is well 
established (Bordo 1990; Butliewicz 1995; Miron 1986). However, as Goodhart (1985) 
argues, it is difficult for central banks to distinguish between solvent and insolvent banks. 
Therefore, the bank as the LLR is faced with a trade-off between the stability of the 
financial system and moral hazard (Cordella and Yayati 2003). 
      Drawing on the experience of the United States and Europe, Bordo (1990, p. 9) states 
that “[a]ssistance to insolvent banks was the exception rather than the rule until the 1970s 
… [t]he monetary authority in earlier times erred on the side of deficiency rather than 
excess.” However, not so much is known about how the central banks have dealt with the 
trade-off. In this paper we address this issue focusing on the Bank of Japan (BOJ) in the 
period before the Second World War. The Japanese financial system became unstable in the 
1920s and the BOJ actively played the role of LLR. We explore how the BOJ selected the 
banks to be bailed out and what implications the BOJ’s policy had.     
In the literature on Japanese financial history, Ehiro (2000) and Ito (2003) review 
the role of the BOJ as the LLR during this period. As they point out, the LLR loan by the 
BOJ was a major policy tool for stabilizing the financial system of the 1920s. In another 
strand of the literature, Yabushita and Inoue (1993) found that the probability of bank 
closure during the financial crisis of 1927 was negatively correlated with the profitability 
and the ratio of risky assets of a bank. Okazaki (2002) and Okazaki, Sawada, and  4
Yokoyama (2005) confirmed this result using data regarding a wider range of bank exits. 
Yabushita and Inoue concluded that bank closures during the financial crisis of 1927 were 
not contagious.1 In the context of this paper, this interpretation suggests that the LLR 
loans by the BOJ successfully prevented financial crises from becoming contagious. Further, 
the negative correlation between bank performance and bank closure suggests that the 
LLR loans did not impair the selection mechanism of the market, by bailing out insolvent 
banks. In other words, it seems that the BOJ could deal with the above trade-off reasonably 
well. 
In order to understand how this occurred, it should be noted that the BOJ was 
selective in its provision of LLR loans, and that LLR loans were crucial for banks (Ishii 
1980). Ishii (1980) indicated that those banks which already had transaction relationships 
with the BOJ were the main recipients of LLR loans, and that those banks, for the most 
part, were large–sized ones.2 Referring to this fact, this paper will examine how the BOJ 
selected its transaction counterparts, using internal documents from the BOJ and 
bank-level quantitative data.   
The BOJ archives hold the original documents on the individual openings and 
closings of transaction relationships with private banks in the pre-war period. I look at how 
the BOJ evaluated banks that applied to open a transaction relationship, and how it made 
the decision to approve or reject such applications. Nihon Ginko Enkakushi (The History of 
the BOJ) also contains comprehensive records of the individual transaction relationships 
                                                   
1  Korenaga, Nagase and Teranishi (2001) reexamined their proposition by discriminating 
between two waves of bank closures in 1927 and found that while the second wave was 
contagious, the first was not. It is important to explore how the LLR loans from the BOJ 
affected these attributes of the bank closures. 
2  Following Ishii (1980), Shiratori (2003) argues that the BOJ’s selective stance was based 
on its policy of maintaining the value of the currency in preparation for the return to the 
gold standard.  5
between the BOJ and private banks.3 Based on these materials, a database of the 
transaction relationships was constructed and matched with another containing financial 
data of individual banks. Using the matched dataset, I econometrically analyze the 
determinants of the transaction relationships between the BOJ and private banks. Adding 
another dataset to the above data, I directly examine how the BOJ selected the recipient 
banks of LLR loans.   
Lastly, I investigate how the transaction relationships with the BOJ affected bank 
management. Specifically, I examine the effects on the portfolio management and 
risk-taking of a bank to see whether moral hazard, which the literature indicates is a 




The period from the 1920s to the early 1930s was a major epoch in the financial 
history of Japan. Following the passing of the National Bank Act in 1872, and the Bank Act 
in 1890, the banking industry in Japan grew rapidly, with many new entrants. In 1900, the 
number of ordinary banks reached a peak of 1890, which was followed by a significant 
shake-out (Figure 1). This shake-out was accelerated by the impact and sudden end of the 
boom during the First World War. Due to high economic growth and loose monetary policy 
during the war, bank deposits increased sharply, which brought about a substantial change 
in the balance sheet of the banking sector. Before this, the average ratio of equity to total 
liabilities was as high as 25 percent later dropping to 15-20 percent in the 1920s.   
Many banks lent out large sums to new industries that developed during the war 
                                                   
3  Nippon Ginko Enkakushi is an unpublished series of volumes on the BOJ’s history, as 
edited by the BOJ.  6
boom. However, these industries were faced with difficulties when international 
competition recommenced after the war. The macro-economic policy of the Japanese 
government made the depression even worse. While the Japanese government stopped 
using the gold standard during the war, it intended to return to it at the previous parity 
level. For that purpose, the government intervened in the foreign exchange market to keep 
the yen exchange rate close to the previous parity, which in turn made international 
competition still tougher for Japanese industries. Further, a natural disaster seriously 
damaged the financial system. In 1923, the Great Kanto Earthquake hit the area that 
includes Tokyo and Yokohama, and assets worth around 3,290 million yen,4 approximately 
equal to 22 percent of Japan’s GNP in 1923, were destroyed (Bank of Japan 1983, p.48; 
Okazaki 1997, p.135). This implies that collateral and firms’ assets, which would otherwise 
generate profits, were damaged. In turn this rendered a large number of bank loans 
non-performing. 
In addition, since the end of the 1910s, many banks expanded their branch networks. 
The initial cause was agreement among major banks in 1918 on the deposit interest rate. 
As a result of the agreement, the spread between the deposit and loan interest rates 
increased, which had the effect of stimulating competition among banks for deposits 
(Tsurumi 1981, p.77; Okazaki 1993, p.304). In Japan, branch-banking was underdeveloped 
before the First World War, which limited interregional competition in the banking industry. 
However, in the 1920s, due to the expansion of branch networks, fierce interregional 
competition developed.   
The change in the banks’ balance sheets and the level of interregional competition 
led to instability in the financial system of the 1920s. I measure the level of instability in 
the financial system by the interest rate spread between risky debt and safe debt 
                                                   
4  The damage estimate for Tokyo and Yokohama Cities only.  7
(Bernanke 1983; Stock and Watson 1989; Mishkin 1991). Specifically, we use the spread 
between the average bank loan and government bond rates (Shikano 1993; Okazaki 1993). 
Figure 2 shows the long-term time series of the interest rate spread.  Before the First 
World War, we can identify four spikes in the interest rate spread, in 1900, 1904, 1907 and 
1913. They correspond to four episodes of bank panic (Akashi and Suzuki 1957, 1958; 
Nagaoka 1971; Oshima 1952). During these panics, the spread rose above 4%. Just after 
the War, the spread increased sharply, which reflects the bank panic that occurred in 1920 
(Oshima 1952; Takeda 1983). It is notable that in the 1920s, the spread stayed around 4%, 
which is close to the level observed in bank panics before the War, suggesting that the 
financial system was continuously unstable over this period. Bank panics occurred in 1922, 
1923 and 1927, of which the panic in 1927 was the most serious and dubbed the Showa 
Financial Crisis (Oshima 1955; Takahashi and Morigaki 1993; Takeda 1983). It is 
noteworthy that we cannot observe the individual impacts of these panics. We will discuss 
the reason why these individual panics were not reflected in the interest rate spread below.   
Under the prolonged financial instability of the 1920s, the shake-out of banks 
proceeded rapidly. The number of ordinary banks in Japan including Sakhalin and Taiwan, 
which was 1799 in 1922, had dropped sharply to 683 by the end of 1931. Of the gross 
decrease of 1227 banks during this period,5 847 were due to mergers, and the other 380 to 
failures and voluntary liquidations (Figure 1). One of the reasons why so many mergers 
took place was the merger promotion policy adopted by the Ministry of Finance. Since the 
1890s, the Ministry of Finance had the intention of promoting bank mergers to stabilize the 
financial system, but no specific measures were undertaken until the 1920s. In 1920, 
through a revision to the Bank Act, the procedure for effecting bank mergers was made 
easier than for mergers between non-bank companies. In 1923, the Ministry of Finance 
                                                   
5  There were 111 new entries in this period, most of which were due to mergers.  8
issued a notification placing restrictions on the establishment of new branches, which 
spurred major banks to acquire smaller banks in order to expand their branch networks. 
Finally, the Bank Law of 1927 gave the government a powerful means of promoting bank 
mergers. That is, the Bank Law obliged an ordinary bank to have capital of not less than 
one million yen by 1932, and many banks could not meet this criterion without merging 
with other banks (Goto 1970; Bank of Japan 1986, p.512; Okazaki 2002; Okazaki and 
Sawada 2006). 
Due to the change in the structure of the banking industry through mergers and 
failures, as well as monitoring by the Ministry of Finance, based on the Bank Law , the 
instability of the financial system decreased, especially after the Showa Financial Crisis in 
1927. Improvement of macro-economic conditions also contributed to the stabilization of the 
financial system. Japan’s return to the gold standard in early 1930 was short-lived, and it 
abandoned the standard again by the end of 1931, which resulted in a sharp depreciation of 
the yen. Increased exports due to the yen’s depreciation, together with the expanding fiscal 
policy, finally put the long depression to an end (Cha 2003; Flath 2000, pp.58-59; Okazaki 
1997, pp.99-106). Stabilization of the financial system is reflected in the decline of the 
interest rate spread. It started to decline in 1927 and returned to pre-WWI level in 1931 
(Figure 2). In this sense, we can regard the period from 1920 to 1931 as a period of financial 
crisis. 
The Ministry of Finance’s promotion of mergers can be regarded as a structural 
policy to stabilize the financial system by creating a concentrated market structure with 
branch-banking. Meanwhile, the BOJ actively played the role of LLR by giving “Special 
Loans” to private banks facing financial crises. Special Loans included loans based on the 
special laws passed to cope with emergencies (i.e. the Loss Compensation due to 
Earthquake Bill Discount Act passed in 1923, the Bank of Japan Special Loan and Loss  9
Compensation Law passed in 1927, and the Loan to the Taiwan Bank Law passed in 1927), 
and other emergency loans provided at the discretion of the BOJ, skipping due process and 
the conditions that would normally have to be met (Ito 2003, p.171). In the 1920s, Special 
Loans as a proportion of total domestic loans provided by the BOJ climbed to over 90% 
(Table 1). 
The lending pattern of the BOJ indicates that it actively intervened in the financial 
market as the LLR in the 1920s. One of the diagrams in Figure 4 refers to the increase in 
domestic loans from the BOJ compared with the same quarter in the previous year. As 
shown in this figure, the lending pattern of the BOJ was strikingly different before and 
after the First World War. Before the war, lending by the BOJ did not necessarily increase 
when bank panics occurred. In particular, lending by the BOJ seems to be negatively 
associated with the interest rate spread. In other words, the BOJ was not active as the LLR 
before the First World War. However, I observe sharp spikes in BOJ’s lending in 1920, 1922, 
1923 and 1927. It has been assumed that active intervention by the BOJ is the main reason 
why clear spikes in the interest rate spread cannot be found in the 1920s. In playing the 
role of LLR, the BOJ tended to favor those banks with which it already had transaction 
relationships when providing Special Loans (Ishii 1980). Table 2 indicates the composition 
of Special Loans based on the Bank of Japan Special Loan and Loss Compensation Law by 
borrower’s transaction relationship with the BOJ. As shown here, the proportion of banks 
which already had transaction relationships was as high as 95.0%. 
 
3.Transactions between the BOJ and private banks 
The Bank of Japan started transactions with private banks just after its 
establishment in 1882 (The Bank of Japan 1982, p.328). The transactions included current 
deposits, current account transfers, overdraft accounts, correspondent accounts, discounts,  10
and loans. Table 3 summarizes the amount of BOJ transactions with private banks. Until 
the end of the nineteenth century, the main instrument the BOJ used to provide credit to 
private banks was the time loan, and after that, discounting became dominant. This was 
basically because the stamp tax rate on bills became less than for deeds because of revision 
of the Stamp Act in 1899 (Ishii 1999, p.194; Sugiyama and Kawakami 1965). While 
correspondent accounts increased to 240 in 1900, they declined after that because their 
function was replaced by current account transfers. Consequently, in the 1920s and 1930s, 
discounts and current deposits were the major tools used by the BOJ in its transactions 
with private banks.   
The BOJ had internal rules prescribing the procedure that had to be followed when 
opening a transaction with a private bank. First, the private bank that wished to open a 
transaction relationship with the BOJ filed an application with the Business Bureau at the 
headquarters of the BOJ or any its branches. If the Business Bureau or the branch judged 
that the applicant bank was eligible, it sent the application to the Governor of the BOJ. The 
Examination Department at headquarters then examined the application, and if it also 
judged that the applicant bank was eligible, the Governor proposed opening the transaction 
at the next Director Meeting.6 
I identify the ordinary banks that had transaction relationships with the BOJ. The 
basic data can be obtained from the tables: ‘Change in the Correspondents,’ which Ishii 
(1980) used.7  The information in these tables includes the date on which BOJ headquarters 
or one of its branches opened or closed a transaction relationship with the headquarters or 
branches of a bank by the kind of transaction: current deposit, discount, etc. Data from 
                                                   
6 The  Bank  of  Japan,  Nippon Ginko Enkakushi (The History of the Bank of Japan), series 
1-volume 2, p.403, series 2-volume 3, p.1, pp.524-525.   
7  Nippon Ginko Enkakushi (The History of the Bank of Japan), op cit., series2-volume 3 
and series 3-volume 3.  11
September 1923, with respect to the headquarters of the BOJ, and data from January 1909, 
with respect to the BOJ’s branches, are available. For relationships which started before 
September 1923 or January 1909, the starting dates are recorded as: ‘before September 
1923’ or ‘before January 1909.’ Data regarding BOJ’s headquarters are limited because the 
documents were lost in the fire that followed the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923. Using 
this source, I compiled a comprehensive database of the BOJ’s transaction relationships 
from 1923 to 1942. 
I then matched this database with a comprehensive database of ordinary banks in 
Japan (excluding its colonies) from 1925 to 1931. The database of ordinary banks was 
compiled from various issues of the Yearbook of the Bank Bureau issued by the Ministry of 
Finance (Ginkokyoku Nenpo). This source began publishing financial data for each bank 
from 1925. The year 1931 was selected as the end of the period we will focus on because we 
intend to investigate the role of the BOJ’s LLR loans during the financial crisis. Table 4 
compares the number of ordinary banks that had transaction relationships with the BOJ, 
with all the ordinary banks in Japan (excluding its colonies). The number declined sharply 
from 253 in 1925 to 167 in 1931. While this movement corresponds with the decline in the 
total number of ordinary banks, as the latter trend was sharper, the proportion of ordinary 
banks that had transaction relationships with the BOJ increased from 16.5% in 1925 to 
24.6% in 1931, but still they were the minority in terms of numbers (Imuta 1980 and Ishii 
1980). However, in terms of the amounts of deposits and loans, the BOJ correspondent 
banks had a larger share. Their share of the total deposits and loans of ordinary banks was 
higher than 85% in 1931 (Table 5).   
Next, the ordinary banks are classified according to two criteria into several groups to 
compare the ratios of BOJ correspondents between them. Table 6 shows the results of 
classifying banks by deposit scale. With respect to the years 1925 and 1931, we find a clear  12
positive correlation between deposit scale and the ratio of BOJ correspondents. For 
example, in 1925, while all of the ordinary banks whose deposits were greater than 100 
million yen had transaction relationships with the BOJ, only 2.3% of banks whose deposits 
were less than one million yen had transaction relationships with the BOJ, even though 
they represented more than 50% of the banks. The shares of the BOJ correspondents in 
each deposit scale group did not change substantially over time. This implies that the rise 
in the share of the BOJ correspondents in Table 4 basically reflects the change in the 
distribution of bank scale over the years. 
Table 7 shows the results of classifying the banks by the area in which their 
headquarters were located, namely, urban and non-urban areas. The urban area includes 
the seven prefectures: Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, Kanagawa, Aichi, Hyogo, and Fukuoka. With 
respect to location, the proportion of BOJ correspondents was not substantially different 
between the two areas. Finally, I examine the difference in the proportion of BOJ 
correspondents between the prefectures where the headquarters or branches of the BOJ 
were located and those where they were not, as suggested by Imuta (1980). At the end of 
1925, in addition to the headquarters in Tokyo, the BOJ had fifteen branches in fourteen 
prefectures, namely, Osaka, Fukuoka, Aichi, Hokkaido, Kyoto, Fukushima, Hiroshima, 
Ishikawa, Niigata, Nagano, Kumamoto, Akita, Shimane, and Okayama.8 After that, BOJ 
branches were established in Hyogo prefecture in 1927 (Bank of Japan 1986, p.450). The 
proportion of BOJ correspondents was much higher in prefectures with BOJ headquarters 
or branches (Table 8).   
 
4. How did the BOJ select transaction counterparts?   
Using the database of BOJ correspondents, I can identify the names of the ordinary 
                                                   
8  In Hokkaido, the BOJ had two branches in the cities of Otaru and Hakodate.  13
banks which opened and closed transaction relationships with the BOJ and the year when 
these events took place. The numbers of openings and closings in each year from 1926 to 
1931 are shown in Table 9. Ten ordinary banks opened transaction relationships with the 
BOJ during this period, while 96 closed them. For 77 of these 96 banks, the close-year and 
the year they exited from the banking industry were the same. We can infer that they 
closed transaction relationships with the BOJ as a result of their exits. The other 19 banks 
continued business at least until the end of the next year following the close. We regard 
these 19 cases of closing transactions with the BOJ in a narrow sense, that is, the closing of 
transactions not due to exits. The fact that so many closings occurred is worth noting in 
itself. While Special Loans by the BOJ were concentrated with banks which had 
transaction relationships with the BOJ, as Ishii (1980) stressed, a bank would not 
necessarily survive, even if it had a transaction relationship with the BOJ.   
As mentioned in section 1, the documents regarding the individual openings and 
closings of transaction relationships are held at the BOJ’s Archives. In particular, the 
documents regarding openings are a rich source of information, as the openings had to be 
approved at a director’s meeting. From these documents, one can see why the private banks 
wanted to have transaction relationships with the BOJ, and how the BOJ screened 
applications from the private banks. The private banks wanted to transact with the BOJ so 
that they could raise and apply funds flexibly. By borrowing funds from the BOJ in a 
liquidity shortage, they could cope with volatility in the financial market, including 
seasonality, which in turn enabled them to expand the number of opportunities for applying 
funds. 
While the BOJ recognized the situation the private banks were in, it paid attention to 
the following conditions when approving their applications. The first was the soundness of 
the bank’s financial condition in terms of profitability and the riskiness of its portfolio. As  14
the second condition, which is related to the first point, the BOJ took into account the 
composition of the directors and large shareholders, and their personal financial status9. 
The third condition was the bank’s scale and position in the local financial market. The 
BOJ placed considerable emphasis on whether the bank was one of the major banks in the 
area, and if it contributed to financing local industries. Finally, the BOJ took into account 
whether there were alternatives for these banks for raising funds for transactions, other 
than the BOJ. 
Next, I quantitatively examine how those conditions affected the choice of transaction 
counterparts by the BOJ. Taking into account the above observations, I assume the 
following function for the BOJ when choosing a counterpart.   
 
Pr(BOJit=1)=Φ(β’Xit-1 +αi）                                      ( 1 )  
 
BOJit is a dummy variable which equals 1 if bank i had a transaction relationship with the 
BOJ in year t, and 0, otherwise. Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, 
and αi is the individual effects of bank i, which is a normally distributed random variable. 
Xit is a vector of the attributes of bank i in year t, including the attributes of the area where 
bank i was located in year t. In other words, we assume a random-effects probit model. 
For the attributes of a bank, I focus on scale, profitability, riskiness of its portfolio, 
and liquidity, referring to the above case studies. Scale is measured by the log value of the 
bank’s assets (LNASSET). In addition, I use the ranking of the assets in the prefecture in 
each year, normalized by the number of ordinary banks in the prefecture (ASSETRANK). 
Profitability is measured by the return on assets (ROA). Riskiness of the portfolio is 
                                                   
9  Concerning the negative effects of close ties between banks and non-banking companies 
in this period, see Okazaki, Sawada and Yokoyama(2005).    15
measured by the loan deposit ratio (LDR), while liquidity is measured by the reserve ratio 
(RESERVE). I compute RESERVE by (cash + deposits to other banks)/deposits. The 
attribute for the liabilities side of the balance sheet is captured by ratio of equity to assets 
(EQUITY). For the area where a bank was located, I use URBAN, which is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the prefecture where the headquarters of the bank was located was 
Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo or Fukuoka, that is the prefectures of the 
seven largest cities, and 0, otherwise. Because the BOJ prioritized those banks which had 
difficulty accessing the central financial market, as noted above, I expect that the 
coefficient of URBAN will be negative. Also, I use the dummy variable BOJBRANCH, 
which equals 1 if there was a branch of the BOJ in the prefecture where the headquarters 
of the bank was located, and 0, otherwise. As Imuta (1980) indicates, I expect that the 
probability of a bank forming a transaction relationship with the BOJ was higher for banks 
which had their headquarters in the prefectures where a branch of the BOJ was located.                           
I estimate equation (1), using the sample of all the ordinary banks that existed in the 
period from 1926 to 1931. As there were many exits and entries of banks during this period, 
the dataset is an unbalanced panel made up of 5925 observations. The observations where 
BOJ=1 number 1184. The results are shown in Table 10. The coefficient of LNASSET has 
the expected sign and is statistically significant. The coefficient of ROA is positive and 
statistically significant, as expected -- in other words, a bank with high profitability tended 
to have a transaction relationship with the BOJ. As the positive and significant coefficient 
o f  E Q U I T Y  i n d i c a t e s ,  a  b a n k  w i t h  h i g h e r  e q u i t y - a s s e t  r a t i o  a l s o  t e n d e d  t o  h a v e  a  
transaction relationship with the BOJ. Concerning the variables related to the area 
attributes, the coefficient of BOJBRANCH is positive and significant. As expected, the 
probability of becoming a correspondent of the BOJ was higher for the banks in the 
prefectures where BOJ’s branches were located.  16
            In the above analysis, I focused on the state of transaction relationships between the 
BOJ and an ordinary bank in each year. Alternatively, I can focus on the number of 
openings and closings of transaction relationships in each year. First, I analyze the 
determinants of opening transaction relationships between the BOJ and ordinary banks. 
For that purpose, I use the 4731 bank-years, whose BOJ variable in the previous year is 0, 
as the sample. Of these, there were 10 openings of transaction relationships. Then, I create 
the dummy variable BOJOit, which equals one if a bank opened a transaction relationship 
with the BOJ in year t, and 0, otherwise, and regress it with the same independent 
variables as in Table 10, using a random-effects probit model. As the result indicates, ρ is 
not significantly different from 0, which means the panel estimator is not different from the 
pooled estimator. While the coefficient of LNASSET is not statistically significant, the 
coefficient of ASSETRANK is negative and significant. Banks whose asset scale was 
relatively large in the prefecture had a higher probability of opening a transaction 
relationship with the BOJ. The coefficient of BOJBRANCH is positive and significant as in 
Table 10. However, the financial variables are not significant. This may be because the 
number of positive observations of the dependent variable is small. 
      Next, I analyze the determinants of closing transaction relationships between the 
BOJ and ordinary banks. Here, I focus on the 1889 bank-years whose BOJ was 1 in the 
previous year. Of these, 19 banks closed transactions with the BOJ for reasons other than 
exit. We create the dummy variable BOJCit, which equals 1 if bank i closed a transaction 
relationship with the BOJ in year t, and 0, otherwise, and regress it with the same 
independent variables as in Tables 10 and 11, using a random-effects probit model. The 
results are reported in Table 12. The coefficient of LNASSET is negative and statistically 
significant, which implies that there was a higher probability of small banks closing a 
transaction relationship with the BOJ. The coefficient of ROA is negative and statistically  17
significant. Also, the coefficient of RESERVE is negative and statistically significant. The 
result concerning profitability is noteworthy because it implies that the BOJ closed 
transaction relationships with those correspondents whose profitability declined, and did 
not persevere in trying to rescue them by maintaining the transaction relationship. 
   
5. Implications of the LLR loan policy of the BOJ 
    The BOJ was selective concerning its transaction counterparts, before and after it 
opened a transaction relationship with a certain bank. I expected that this “dry” stance 
would be reflected in its LLR policy, and therefore it was effective in dealing with the 
potential moral hazard which might be incurred with the LLR loans. 
    Data on individual Special Loans are available only for those issued according to the 
Bank of Japan Special Loan and Loss Compensation Law passed in 1927, which are cited in 
Ishii (1980), (pp.163-166). Hence, I first used these data to see how the BOJ selected the 
recipient banks of the Special Loans. The Special Loans according to that law started to be 
issued on May 11th in 1927, and were stopped on May 8th in 1928 (Bank of Japan 1933, 
p.955). From Ishii (1980), I identified the banks that had Special Loans in 1927 or 1928.10 
Excluding banks in the colonies and savings banks, we identified 193 bank-years as Special 
Loan recipients. They can be regarded as the banks which the BOJ intended to rescue. As a 
control group, to be compared with the Special Loan recipients, I use banks that exited due 
to reasons other than mergers without receiving Special Loans in 1927 or 1928. The control 
group has 95 bank-years. There were 4 banks which failed even after they received Special 
Loans. This brings the total number of observations to 288. They can be regarded as 
bank-years which needed rescues, from which the BOJ selected LLR loan recipients. 
                                                   
10  We identified a bank as a Special Loan recipient in 1928 if the month when it finished 
repaying the Special Loan was after December 1927.  18
        Using these observations, I estimate the following equation for Special Loan recipient 
selection.  
 
Pr(SLit=1)=Φ(β’Xit-1)                                              ( 2 )                          
 
SLit is a dummy variable which equals 1, if bank i received a Special Loan in year t, and 0, 
otherwise.  Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. As explanatory 
variables we use the following bank and area attributes: LNASSETit-1, ROAit-1 , LDRit-1, RESERVE 
it-1, EQUITYit-1 , URBANit-1 ,  LNASSETit-1*URBANit-1. To these we add the variable BOJ and the 
following interaction terms between BOJ and the financial variables: BOJ it-1* ROAit-1, BOJ it-1* 
LDRit-1 , BOJ it-1* RESERVE it-1, β12BOJ it-1* EQUITYit-1. 
The estimation results are reported in Table 13. The coefficients of LNASSET and 
ROA are positive and significant, which implies that the BOJ took into account the scale 
and profitability of banks in selecting Special Loan recipients. In this sense, the BOJ was 
selective in providing Special Loans. At the same time, it is notable that the coefficient of 
BOJ is positive but not significant, while the coefficient of BOJ * ROA is positive and 
significant. These results mean that a transaction relationship with the BOJ did not 
generally increase the probability of receiving a Special Loan, but that a transaction 
relationship with the BOJ increased the probability for a profitable bank to receive such a 
loan. This suggests that the BOJ used transaction relationships to select profitable banks 
which were eligible to receive Special Loans. 
     The selective LLR policy of the BOJ is expected to be reflected in the effect of a 
transaction relationship with the BOJ on a bank’s survivability. As stated in section 2, 
many banks exited over the period from the 1920s to the early 1930s as a result of mergers 
and failures. And, it has been found that bank failures during this period tended to  19
eliminate banks with poor performance, thereby enhancing the efficiency of the banking 
industry (Yabushita and Inoue 1993; Okazaki 2002; Okazaki, Sawada, and Yokoyama 2005). 
I hypothesize that this property of the failures was related to the role of the BOJ. More 
specifically, through supplying funds selectively to those banks which were facing a 
liquidity shortage but not insolvent, the BOJ supported the efficiency-enhancing effect of 
the selection of banks by the market. In order to examine this hypothesis, we estimate the 
following multinomial probit model for bank exits. 
 
Pr(EXITit=q)=Pr(Uitq>Uitj, j=0, 1, 2, j≠q) 
Uitj=βj’Xit-1+eitj                                                            ( 3 )  
 
where j=0, if bank i survived in year t, j=1, if bank i merged in year t, and j=2, if bank i 
exited due to reasons other than a merger. Xit-1 is a vector of exogenous variables that 
affected bank exits. eitj is the normally distributed error term. In Xit-1 we include the same 
variables as equation (2), but add: the age of bank i (AGE it-1), a dummy variable which 
equals 1 if the prefecture where a bank was located is Tokyo, Kanagawa, or Saitama, which 
were seriously damaged by the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923 (EQ), a dummy variable 
which equals 1 if the bank was a joint-stock company, and 0, otherwise (FORM), and a 
dummy variable which equals 1 if the bank’s capital was smaller than the lower limit of 
capital prescribed under the Bank Law (CRITERION). 
The estimation results are shown in Table 14. ROA is negatively associated with 
failure, which confirms the results of Yabushita and Inoue (1993) and Okazaki (2002). The 
coefficient of BOJ is negative, but not statistically significant, which implies that a 
transaction with the BOJ did not have the effect of increasing the overall survivability of its 
transaction counterparts. However, the coefficient of BOJ*ROA is negative and statistically  20
significant, and the coefficient of BOJ*LDR is positive and statistically significant with 
respect to the failures. These results imply that while a transaction with the BOJ did not 
have the effect of increasing the overall survivability of transaction counterparts, it 
amplified the effect of ROA and LDR. In other words, if banks had a transaction 
relationship with the BOJ, the survivability of good banks increased. This result is 
consistent with that regarding the selection of LLR loan recipients in Table 13. In this 
sense, transaction relationships with the BOJ and LLR loans enhanced the efficacy of the 
selection of banks by the market. 
     Next, I explore the effects of a transaction with the BOJ on bank management, in 
particular, portfolio management. It is natural to expect that a transaction relationship 
with the BOJ reduced the liquidity risk for a bank, which would have enabled it to apply 
funds more aggressively than it otherwise could. To examine this possibility, it is essential 
to deal with the endogeneity of the transaction relationship with the BOJ. I can use 
equation (1) in the previous section to do this. That is, we estimate the following treatment 
effects model (Greene 2000, p.933). 
 
Пit=β’Zit+δBOJit+ei t                                                                         (4) 
BOJit=1, if Vit>0, and 0, otherwise     
Vit=γ’Xit-1+ui t                                                                                  (5) 
 
Пit is a variable indicating management policy or performance of bank i in year t. Zit is a 
vector of exogenous variables which affected Пit. Xit-1 is a vector of exogenous variables 
determining the transaction relationship with the BOJ. The error terms of (4) and (5), eit 
and uit, respectively, are assumed to be normally distributed and correlated with each other. 
As П indicates portfolio management, we focus on the ratio of loans to total assets (LOAN),  21
the ratio of securities to total assets (SECURITIES), LOAN+SECURITIES, and RESERVE. 
For the exogenous variables in equation (4), we use LNASSET, BRANCH, EQUITY and 
year dummies. For the exogenous variables in equation (5), we use LNASSET, URBAN and 
BOJBRANCH, referring to the results in the previous section. 
     The results are shown in Panels A and B of Table 15. As expected, a transaction 
relationship with the BOJ had the effect of reducing the reserve ratio, which implies that a 
BOJ correspondent bank paid less attention to its short-term liquidity position. However, in 
other respects, a transaction relationship with the BOJ did not give a substantial impact on 
banks’ portfolio. While the variable BOJ had a positive effect on SECURITIES, it had a 
negative effect on LOAN, and consequently had no significant effect on 
LOAN+SECURITIES. 
          The results reported in Table 15 are related to the issue of moral hazard which would 
be incurred by the transaction relationships with the BOJ. In order to examine this issue, it 
is necessary to use information on the quality of loans and securities. The problem is that 
this kind of information is not available in the Yearbook of Bank Bureau. To my knowledge, 
there are two alternative sources that provide the necessary information -- that is 
bank-level data for loans by collateral. The first source is business reports from the 
i n d i v i d u a l  b a n k s .  T h e  m e r i t  o f  u s i n g  t h i s  s o u r c e  i s  t h a t  d a t a  o n  b a n k s  i n  v a r i o u s  
prefectures are available. However, business reports are available for only some of the 
ordinary banks, and only some of these business reports contain information on loans by 
collateral. It is also very time consuming to collect data from business reports. The other 
source is the Statistical Yearbook for each prefecture (Fuken Tokeisho). The merit of using 
this source is that we can systematically gather the data for loans by collateral with respect 
to all banks in the prefecture. However, only the Yearbooks of three prefectures, namely 
Fukushima (until 1929), Shiga (until 1930), and Kumamoto have bank-level data on loans  22
by collateral. 
     Therefore, I used both these sources, taking into account their characteristics. First, 
from business reports included in the micro-film collection of business reports edited by 
Yushodo Press, I collected data for loans by collateral in 1926 for 153 of the 1416 ordinary 
banks in Japan (excluding its colonies). I created two variables indicating a bank’s 
risk-taking, namely, the ratio of loans without collateral and loans with real estate 
collateral to total loans (RISK), and the ratio of loans with public bond collateral to total 
loans (SAFE). Using cross-sectional data for RISK and SAFE in 1926 as the independent 
variables, we estimate treatment effects models similar to equations (6) and (7), to see the 
effect of the variable BOJ on RISK and SAFE. The results are reported in Table 16. For 
both cases, RISK and SAFE, the coefficients of BOJ are not significant. This implies that a 
transaction relationship with the BOJ did not have a significant impact on a bank’s 
risk-taking. 
     Second, I used data from the Statistical Yearbooks of Fukushima (1926-29), Shiga 
(1926-30), and Kumamoto (1926-31) prefectures. From these sources, I have 239 
observations for RISK and SAFE, as defined above. Using these observations, I estimate 
the following fixed-effects model. 
 
Πit=β’Xit +αi+eit                                                ( 6 )  
 
Πit is RISK or SAFE for bank i in year t. Xit is a vector of exogenous variables including 
BOJ. αi is the fixed-effects of bank i, and eit is the normally distributed error term. I control 
for the unobserved factors that may be correlated with the variable BOJ by using 
fixed-effects αi. The results are reported in Table 17. As with the results for the treatment 
effects models, the coefficient of BOJ is not significant for either RISK or SAFE. Again,  23
there is no evidence that a transaction relationship with the BOJ significantly impacted on 
a bank’s risk-taking. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
     Under the unstable financial system of the 1920s, the BOJ actively intervened in the 
market as the LLR, which is reflected in the spikes in BOJ lending during periods of bank 
panic. The BOJ concentrated LLR loans with those banks which already had a transaction 
relationship with the BOJ, and it selected transaction counterparts based on the 
applications made by private banks. From case studies regarding the opening of 
transaction relationships, we found that the BOJ used the following criteria in selecting 
counterparts: (a) the financial condition of the bank (i.e. profitability and soundness of the 
portfolio), (b) the composition of the directors and large shareholders, and their private 
assets, (c) the scale of the bank and its position in the local financial market, and (d) the 
availability of funds other than BOJ loans. This finding is confirmed by econometric 
analysis of the determinants of the transaction relationship. That is, the probability of 
having a transaction relationship with the BOJ was high for those banks whose ROA was 
high and whose scale was large. And, for banks whose ROA was low and whose reserve 
ratio was low, the probability of a transaction relationship with the BOJ being closed was 
high. It is noteworthy that banks whose profitability was low could not maintain a 
transaction relationship with the BOJ. 
         This policy of the BOJ in selecting transaction counterparts was consistent with the 
policy for selecting Special Loan recipients. In selecting recipients from the banks which 
needed rescue, the BOJ focused on their profitability. The probability of receiving an LLR 
loan was higher for a bank with a higher ROA. Further, a transaction relationship with the 
BOJ did not have the overall effect of increasing the probability for transaction  24
counterparts to receive LLR loans, but it did increase the probability for profitable 
counterparts to receive LLR loans. As a result, a transaction relationship with the BOJ had 
no significant overall effect on a bank’s survivability, but it did enhance the effect of a high 
ROA on the survivability of a bank. These policies of the BOJ were effective in preventing 
moral hazard in banks, which could be incurred by LLR loans. There is no evidence that a 
transaction relationship with the BOJ had a significant impact on a bank’s risk-taking. 
   The 1920s was an epoch of structural changes in Japanese financial history. Due to 
the harsh competition and poor macro-economic environment, a number of banks exited 
through mergers and failures. At the same time, during this wave of mergers and failures, 
an important feature of the Japanese financial system, namely, close ties between banks 
and industrial firms, which was one of the basic sources of bad loans in this period, declined 
(Teranishi 2003; Okazaki, Sawada and Wang 2006). The LLR loans by the BOJ were a 
measure to cope with financial instability accompanying the structural changes. However, 
it is possible that the LLR loans themselves could have incurred a moral hazard and 
impeded structural changes. The BOJ’s LLR policy successfully avoided this problem, while 
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 Table1 Composition of the domestic loans by the BOJ
Total Special lonas Percentage
(1000 yen) (1000 yen)
1923 641,336 133,530 20.8
1924 523,792 144,840 27.7
1925 463,964 148,091 31.9
1926 517,907 159,035 30.7
1927 815,297 402,983 49.4
1928 769,658 649,496 84.4
1929 649,655 598,180 92.1
1930 688,473 585,434 85.0
1931 882,718 575,742 65.2
1932 632,040 565,648 89.5
1933 707,013 552,430 78.1
1934 712,841 529,820 74.3
1935 661,658 498,176 75.3
1936 585,628 472,480 80.7
Source: Ministry of Finance, Handbook of Financial Issues, 1930 and 1938 issues.Table 2 Composition of the BOJ Special Loans by borrower's transaction relationship with the BOJ 
Amount (1000 yen) Precentage
Total 761,971 100.0
BOJ correnpondent banks 723,859 95.0
Other banks 38,112 5.0
Source: Ishii[1980], pp.163-166.
Note: Only the Special Loans according to the Bank of Japan Special Loan and Loss Compensation
     Law.Table 3 Amount of the BOJ's transaction with private banks
Loan Overdrawn of




1000 yen 1000 yen 1000 yen 1000 yen
1882 477 0 0 253 ･･･
1885 2,586 32 1,315 324 ･･･
1890 13,540 2,284 12,578 2,403 ･･･
1895 24,933 4,395 26,183 1,601 126
1900 7,683 3,764 80,195 2,007 240
1905 9,646 403 28,152 10,824 176
1910 6,900 2,589 29,323 7,363 155
1915 1,950 837 26,786 8,979 153
1920 1,700 1,611 155,296 49,942 116
1925 0 9,267 306,606 54,513 72
1930 0 0 103,039 112,625 42
1935 0 570 162,913 112,568 ･･･
Source: Bank of Japan (1986), pp. 272-289; Semiannual Report of the Bank of Japan , various issues;
     Yearbook of the Bank Bureau , various issues.Table 4 Number of ordinary banks with transaction relationship with the BOJ
Total  BOJ correspondent banksShare(%)
1925 1,532 253 16.5
1926 1,416 246 17.4
1927 1,279 225 17.6
1928 1,026 197 19.2
1929 877 180 20.5
1930 777 173 22.3
1931 678 167 24.6
Source:  See the text.
Note: Banks in the colonies are not included.Table 5 Share of the BOJ correspondent banks in terms of deposit and loan amount
Deposit Loan
BOJ correspondent banks 1925 6,992 7,315
(million yen) 1931 7,333 5,741
Total 1925 8,666 9,198
(million yen) 1931 8,203 6,691
Percentage 1925 80.7 79.5
1931 89.4 85.8
Source:  See the text.
Note: Banks in the colonies are not included.Table 6 Share of the BOJ correspondent banks in terms of number by deposit scale in terms of bank number
Total BOJ correspondent banks Share(%)
1925 100 million yen≦deposit 16 16 100.0
10 million yen≦deposit＜100 million yen 106 93 87.7
5 million yen≦deposit＜10 million yen 88 46 52.3
1 million yen≦deposit＜5 million yen 464 78 16.8
deposit＜1 million yen 858 20 2.3
1931 100 million yen≦deposit 13 13 100.0
10 million yen≦deposit＜100 million yen 85 73 85.9
5 million yen≦deposit＜10 million yen 55 29 52.7
1 million yen≦deposit＜5 million yen 234 40 17.1
deposit＜1 million yen 291 12 4.1
Source:  See the text.
Note: Banks in the colonies are not included.Table 7 Share of the BOJ corespondent banks by area in terms of bank number
Total BOJ correspondent banksShare (%)
1925 Urban 478 83 17.4
Non-urban 1,054 170 16.1
1931 Urban 208 56 26.9
Non-urban 470 111 23.6
Source: See the text.
Note: Banks in the colonies are not included.
        Urban area refers to the seven prefectures, Tokyo, Kanagawa, Aichi, Kyoto, Osaka, Hyogo
        and Fukuoka.Table 8 Share of the BOJ correspondent banks by proximity to the BOJ headquarters or a branch 
      in terms of bank number
Total BOJ correrspondent banks Share (%)
1925 With the BOJ headquarters or a branch  597 139 23.3
Without the BOJ headquarters or a branch 935 114 12.2
1931 With the BOJ headquarters or a branch  313 95 30.4
Without the BOJ headquarters or a branch 365 72 19.7
Source:  See the text.
Note: Banks in the colonies are not included.Table 9 Number of openings and closures of transaction relationships with the BOJ
Openings Closures
Survive Exit
Total 10 96 19 77
1926 29 4 5
1927 12 2 2 2 0
1928 23 0 8 2 2
1929 11 8 2 1 6
1930 29 1 8
1931 28 2 6
Source: See the text.Table 10 Determinants of transaction relationships with the BOJ 
Dependent variable: BOJT Coeffieient ∂Pr/∂x
Const. -45.139 ***
(2.564)































Number of obs. 5925
Number of positive obs. 1184
Number of groups 1467
Note: Estimates by random-effects probit model.
        Standard errors are in parentheses.
       ∂Pr/∂x are the partial derivatives evaluated at the sample means.
        ***  Statistically significant at 1％ level
        **  Statistically significant at 5％ level
        *  Statistically significant at 10％ levelTable 11 Determinants of openings of transaction relationships with the BOJ 






ASSETRANKt-1 -0.130 * -0.711*10
-11
(0.071)






























Number of observations 4731
Number of positive observati 10
Number of groups 1227
Note: Estimates by random-effects probit model.
        Standard errors are in parentheses.
       ∂Pr/∂x are the partial derivatives evaluated at the sample means.
        ***  Statistically significant at 1％ level
        **  Statistically significant at 5％ level
        *  Statistically significant at 10％ levelTable 12 Determinants of closures of transaction relationships with the BOJ 
Dependent variable：BOJTC Coefficient ∂Pr/∂x
Const. 4.363 *
(2.591)


















# -4.822 * -0.229
(2.700)












Number of obs. 1189
Number of positive obs. 19
Number of groups 266
Note: Estimates by random-effects probit model.
        Standard errors are in parentheses.
       ∂Pr/∂x are the partial derivatives evaluated at the sample means.
        # ∂Pr/∂x are for discrete change of dummy variables.
        ***  Statistically significant at 1％ level
        **  Statistically significant at 5％ level




LNASSETt-1 0.522 *** 0.190
(0.096)

























Number of obs. 288
Number of positive obs. 193
Note: Estimates by random-effects probit model.
        Standard errors are in parentheses.
       ∂Pr/∂x are the partial derivatives evaluated at the sample means.
        # ∂Pr/∂x are for discrete change of dummy variables.
        ***  Statistically significant at 1％ level
        **  Statistically significant at 5％ levelTable 14 Effect of a transaction relationship with the BOJ on bank exit
Failure Merger
Coefficient ∂Pr/∂x Coefficient ∂Pr/∂x
Const. 2.583 *** -0.171
(0.816) (0.658)
LNASSET -0.388 *** -0.017 -0.120 *** -0.010
(0.052) (0.042)















EQUITY 1.296 *** 0.064 -0.374 * -0.055
(0.230) (0.215)
AGE 0.007 * 0.268*10




# 0.138 * 0.007 -0.064 -0.009
(0.080) (0.070)
CRITERION
# -0.196 -0.011 0.177 * 0.022
(0.129) (0.094)
URBAN
# 0.130 0.008 -0.143 ** -0.017
(0.091) (0.071)
EQ




# 0.289 0.016 -0.064 -0.010
(0.329) (0.253)
BOJ*ROA -22.116 *** -0.959 -8.933 -0.832
(8.429) (5.943)
BOJ*LDR 0.039 *** 0.003 -0.123 -0.015
(0.014) (0.152)
BOJ*RESERVE 1.269 * 0.055 0.498 0.046
(0.768) (0.794)





Number of obs. 6846
Number of positive obs. 286 633
Note: Estimates by multinominal probit model.
       ∂Pr/∂x are the partial derivatives evaluated at the sample means.
        # ∂Pr/∂x are for discrete change of dummy variables.Table 15 Effect of a transaction relationship with the BOJ on bank management
A.Portfolio effect
Const. -0.344 -0.246 *** -0.589 ** -17.57 ***
(0.261) (0.092) (0.291) (3.478)
LNASSET 0.069 *** 0.024 *** 0.093 *** 1.076 ***
(0.018) (0.006) (0.020) (0.244)
BRANCH -0.002 -0.002 ** -0.003 -0.034
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.026)
EQUITY 0.849 *** 0.006 0.856 *** 8.566 ***





BOJ -0.217 ** 0.096 *** -0.122 -3.253 ***
(0.093 (0.033) (0.104) (1.240)
Wald χ
2 132.60 150.69 96.13 145.75
Number of obs. 5920 5920 5920 5920
Note: Estimates by treatment effect model.　First we estimate equation(2) in the text to probit model to obtain the
        estimate of BOJ. Then, we estimate equation(1) by OLS, using the estimate of BOJ. The estimation result of
         equation (2) is reported in this Table.
        Year dummies are included, although not reported.
        Standard errors are in parentheses.
        Degree of freedom of Wald χ
2　is 9 for (a) ,(b) and (c), and 11 for (d).
        ***  Statistically significant at 1％ level
        **  Statistically significant at 5％ level














Number of obs. 5920











RESERVETable 16 Effect of a transaction relationship with the BOJ on bank's risk taking　(1): 
     Treatment effect model
A. Risk taking effect




















Number of obs. 153 153
Note: Estimates by treatment effect model.　First we estimate equation of BOJ, then 
        we estimate equation of loan by collateral by OLS, using the estimate of BOJ. 
        The estimation result of BOJ equation is reported in panel B in this table.
        Year dummies are included, although not reported.
        Standard errors are in parentheses.
        ***  Statistically significant at 1％ level
        **  Statistically significant at 5％ level














Number of obs. 153




variable: SAFETable 17 Effect of a transaction relationship with the BOJ on bank's risk taking (2):
     Fixed-effects estimation
Const. 1.886 *** 0.077
(0.701) (0.126)
LNASSET -0.101 ** -0.003
(0.047) (0.007)












Number of obs. 239 239
Note: Estimates by fixed-effect model, using the data on Fukushima, Shiga and Kumamoto prefectures.
        Standard errors are in parentheses.
        Fixed-effects of individual banks and year dummies are included, although not reported.
        ***  Statistically significant at 1％ level
        **  Statistically significant at 5％ level
        *  Statistically significant at 10％ level
(a) Dependent
variable: RISK
(b) Dependent
variable: SAFE